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Recent Cases
EXPERT WITNEss-PAYMENT OF CONTINGENT FEE
Barnes v. Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis1
The respondent Barnes, a psychiatrist, agreed to testify to the insanity of
the deceased, Hugh Thomasson, and to assist in securing evidence to establish
insanity. His compensation was to be on a contingent: fee basis-an agreed sum
to be paid him only in the event -of a successful termination of the intended litiga-
tion, which involved a suit to be brought by the next of kin of Thomasson to set
aside mortgages and deeds executed by Thomasson while under the influence of
his wife and her associates. The respondent recovered in the lower court for the
value of his services on a quantum mneruit basis. The appellant argued that the
entire agreement was void as against public policy, and hence respondent should
not be compensated. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the decision of the
circuit court that the respondent could recover the reasonable value of his services
in preparing the evidence for submission at the trial.2
The respondent contracted both to testify and to gather evidence for use in
court proceedings. However, under the Missouri law he could not recover for
testifying. In Burnett v. Freeman3 the court of appeals decided that a physician,
or other expert, could be compelled to testify concerning matters within his pro-
fessional knowledge without compensation other than the ordinary witness fee.
The common law view was that an expert witness was not bound to give testimony
concerning his professional opinion. A distinction was drawn between ;L man seeing
a fact and giving an opinion on a matter with which he is peculiarly acquainted in
a professional capacity. Also the expert witness had a right to demand before
testifying that he be compensated for loss of time.4 Some strong arguments are
offered for the validity of this distinction, especially as to medical experts, The
physician is quite often called upon to attend court to give testimony concerning
his professional opinion, while such demands are rarely made on most other pro-
fessions. Also there may be instances of individual hardship, as where an eminent
physician or surgeon may have acquired such a wide reputation for professional
skill that there is a constant demand for his services as a witness, interfering with
the practice of his profession. The court in Burnett v. Freemanu admitted that
there was a valid basis for these contentions but thought the considerations on
the other side outweighed them. The court said that the medical expert was simply
performing his duty as a citizen in testifying at the usual rate; also he had the
privilege of calling on other experts to give evidence if he himself ever became
1. 348 Mo. 1032, 156 S. W. (2d) 597 (1941).
2. Id. at 1036, 156 S. W. (2d) at 599-600.
3. 125 Mo. App. 683, 103 S. W. 121 (1907).
4. See cases collected in Note (1895) 27 L. R. A. 673-4.
5. 125 Mo. App. 683, 103 S. W. 121 (1907).
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involved in litigation. Consequently the court held that the contract to pay the
physician a remuneration additional to the regular witness fees was void as against
public policy. In State v. Bell6 the Supreme Court of Missouri approved the
doctrine of Burnett v. Freeman. Although the trend- of the later cases in the
United States is in accord with the holding of the Missouri court,7 there is still
considerable authority for the proposition that expert witnesses may be paid
additional compensation for testifying as to their opinions as experts.8
The precise question involved in the principal case is the effect of the invalidity
of the contract to testify on the agreement to gather evidence. In Klepper v. Klep-
per9 it was held that the expert could recover the reasonable value of his services
in examining property and compiling data for use in the litigation, even though he
could not recover on the contract itself, which included a provision for his testify-
ing in court. But an Illinois court held that such a contract is entire, and if a part
of the consideration is illegal the promise founded upon the contract is void.1o
Consequently that court refused to permit recovery of the agreed sum, though the
plaintiff had produced the desired evidence. The courts have generally held void
contracts to furnish evidence establishing a given set of facts." Such a contract
is void whether it be to secure sufficient evidence to enable the client to win or
merely to furnish favorable evidence.' 2
However, the courts have upheld advertisements for rewards for the produc-
tion of evidence. 13 The distinction is a doubtful one, for the purpose of securing
the evidence is to prove a given set of facts, as in the preceding type of case.
The only difference would seem to be that the contracts in the reward cases are
unilateral, and the person securing the evidence is not bound by any agreement
to do so. There might be some additional incentive to stretch a point in the em-
ployer's favor where one has entered into a binding contract to produce the
evidence. However, the courts in these cases seem to stress the incentive to profit.1"
The courts have generally held valid contracts to pay expert witnesses for
preparatory work, such as making investigations or gathering data.' 5 It is also
usually held proper to determine such compensation upon a contingent fee basis.'6
6. 212 Mo. 111, 111 S. W. 24 (1908).
7. See cases in Note (1910) 25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1040.
8. 6 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs (1938) § 1716.
9. 199 Mo. App. 294, 202 S. W. 593 (1918).
10. Boehmer v. Foval, 55 Ill. App. 71 (1893).
11. Neece v. Joseph, 95 Ark. 552 (1910).
12. See cases collected in (1911) 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 278.
13. Plating Co. v. Farquharson, 17 Ch. Div. 49 (1881).
14. Neece v. Joseph, 95 Ark. 552 (1910).
15. 6 WILLISTON, CoTRrAcTs (1938) § 1716; 12 Am. Jur. § 188; RESTATEMENT,
CoNTAcTs (1932) § 553, (1). Contra: Manufacturers and Merchants Inspection
Bureau v. Everwear Hosiery Co., 152 Wisc. 73 (1913); Gillett v. Logan County,
67 IIl. 256 (1873).
16. 12 Am. Jur.,§ 188. However, the courts condemn an agreement by an
attorney to divide his contingent fee with one who is to secure evidence. 6 WILLIS-
TON, CoNmers (1938) § 1716. Contra: Parker v. Fryberger, 171 Minn. 384, 214
N. W. 276 (1927).
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The instant case, therefore, is in accord with the great weight of authority in up-
holding an agreement to pay the witness a fixed sum in the event of the successful
termination of the litigation. However, the expert must have acted in the capacity
of an expert in preparing the evidence for trial, and not for some unrelated pur-
pose.1 7 One of the arguments used in these cases is that the expert witness, while
engaged in the activity of gathering evidence to be used in court proceedings, is in
a position similar to that occupied by an attorney who is employed under a con-
tingent fee contract'18 The identical social problem is present in both instances.
There are numerous plaintiffs who are financially unable to employ a capable
attorney on a regular fee basis. Their only hope of securing any recovery is to
find an attorney willing to take their case on a contingent fee. Often such recovery
is impossible without having available the services of an expert witness, who is
also paid a contingent fee. If such contracts were not permitted the wealthy and
financially secure would have a great advantage over those less fortunately situated.
There is, however, greater likelihood of abuse by expert witnesses than by attorneys,
for the latter are subject to more control by the court and to the influence of
professional ethics and are more limited in the direct influence of their chicanery.
In so far as the possible effect on the veracity of testimony is concerned, there
would seem to be as much objection to the type of contract involved in the prin-
cipal case as to agreements to pay witnesses compensation in addition to the fee
allowed by law. Since the expert recovers nothing unless his efforts result in a
termination of the litigation favorable to his employer, and since it is intended
that the evidence gathered by him be submitted in the form of testimony at the
trial, his testimony will likely be presented in a form favorable to his employer.
However, in holding invalid contracts to pay additional compensation for testifying
the courts stress the tendency of the contracts to cause perjury and fabrication of
evidence, while in sustaining contracts under which the expert is to do preparatory
work before testifying the courts say that the possibility of abuse is no reason
for declaring a contract void if there has in fact been no abuse.'0
The courts do not face the realities of the situation when they distinguish the
type of contract in the instant case from an agreement to secure evidence proving
the employer's case. Neither of'the parties to such a contract has any ideal pur-
pose to ascertain the truth; the intent is to find evidence that will support a
recovery. The expert is well aware of the fact that he will not be paid if he does
not procure evidence which will effectively establish his client's case.
Although there does not seem to be any logical basis for the distinctions made
by the courts, contracts for the payment of contingent fees will undoubtedly be
upheld so long as there is no satisfactory alternative method by which the poor man
can secure the services of an expert witness.
WILLIAM E. AULGUR
17. Burnett v. Freeman, 134 Mo. App. 709, 115 S. W. 488 (1909).
18. Haley v. Hollenback, 53 Mont 494, 165 Pac. 459 (1917).
19. Compare Neece v. Joseph, 95 Ark. 552 (1910), with Lincoln Mountain
Gold Mining Co. v. Williams, 37 Colo. 193, 85 Pac. 844 (1906).
[Vol. 8
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RECENT CASES
LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR INJURY CAUSED BY HORSEPLAY OF EMPLOYEE
Osment v. PitcairnI
Plaintiff, member of an interstate switching crew, while standing in railroad's
freight house was seized from behind by a messenger boy employed by railroad
and held so as to lose consciousness, resulting in a fractured skull from falling
to the floor. There was evidence to show that the railroad had knowledge that
the boy habitually engaged in such rough horseplay. Plaintiff sought recovery
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act on two theories-the negligence of the
railroad in knowingly retaining a servant who habitually engaged in dangerous
misconduct, and the failure of a special policeman nearby to prevent the injury.
The issue upon which the court disposes of the case is whether the acts of horseplay
must be within the scope of the messenger's employment in order to allow a recov-
ery under the Act, the court finding that such is necessary.
Of course, the rights of the plaintiff and obligations of the defendant will depend
upon the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the applicable principles of common
law as interpreted by the federal courts.2 The common law doctrine which is basic
to the instant case is that advanced by the plaintiff, i~e., that a master owes to
his servants the duty of hiring and retaining fellow workers who are "of sufficient
care, skill, prudence and good habits to make it probable that they will not cause
injury to each other."3 Although this theory of liability is a tort theory based
solely on the negligence of the employer himself, the tendency of the courts has
been to transplant the principles of the law of' agency which are applicable to a
master's liability for his servant's torts, and-thus to restrizjemcnyery .to, thos
instances where the act causing the injury was committed within the scope of th
wrongdoer's employment.4 In view of this it is not strange that the general rule
postulated by the majority of the courts is that an employer is not liable for
injuries inflicted on an employee by the horseplay of a coemployee, since horse-
play is seldom considered within the scope of the employment5
Before being led too far astray of the original theory by this misapplication,
however, the courts seem to have realigned themselves by making certain excep-
tions to their general rule, one of which is that the employer will be liable for acts
outside the scope of the wrongdoer's employment if he knows, or ought to know,
1. 159 S. W. (2d) 666 (Mo. 1941).
2. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Coogan, 271 U. S. 472 (1926); King v. Schu-
macher, 32 Cal. App. (2d) 172, 89 P. (2d) 466 (1939; Weiand v. Southern Pac.
Co., 34 Cal. App. (2d) 500, 93 P. (2d) 1023 (1939).
3. 2 SHEARMAN AND REDFIELD, NEGLIGENCE (rev. ed. 1941) 456. Also see,
Allen v. Quercus Lumber Co., 171 Mo. App. 492, 157 S. W. 661 (1913); 3 LABATr,
MASTER AND SERVANT (1913) 2860.
4. Medlin Milling Co. v. Boutwell, 104 Tex. 87, 133 S. W. 1042, 34 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 109 (1911); 35 AM. Jum., MASTER AND SERVANT § 201.
5. Emphatically so stated in Federal Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Havolic, 162 Wis.
341, 156 N. W. 143, L. R. A. 1916D 968 (1916).
1943]
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of the propensity of the employee to commit those harmful acts.6 In this manner
the final result approaches that which is achieved by holding strictly to the tort
theory, as is done by the Restatement of Torts, 7 which says that the master has
a duty to use reasonable care to control those acts of his servants which are out-
side the course of the employment, so long as the servant is on the master's
premises and- the master knows or should know of the need to control the acts
to prevent harm. Thus, recovery for injury from acts of dangerous or harmful
horseplay, by persons who habitually engage in such to the knowledge of the em-
ployer, may be had from that employer under the common law principles applicable
to the instant case.8 The fact that the injured pliantiff happens to be another
employee should make no difference.
This trend of the courts, as shown in the common law, is further illustrated
by similar cases arising under the various state workmen's compensation acts.0
The great majority of these acts expressly state that to merit recovery the injury
must be one "arising out of and in the course of the employment,"'1 thus giving
the same result with regard to acts of horseplay as does the "scope of employment"
requirement at common law. Many of the courts have likewise managed to give
some relief in these cases, though, by reasoning which is just the opposite of that
used in the common law cases, that is, instead of making an exception to the gen-
eral rule in cases where the employer knows or ought to know of the frequent
6. The court in Hogle v. H. H. Franklin Mfg. Co., 199 N. Y. 388, 92 N. E.
794, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1038 (1910), affirmed a case sent to the jury on these
instructions: "I do not intend to talk to you about negligence, or about a nuisance,
or about any other subject with a technical name. I want you to consider simply,
in the light of common sense, what is due from one man to another, from one
neighbor to another. . . . If my servant repeatedly, with my knowledge, even if
he is not engaged in my business, throws stones at you and injures you, I should
do what I reasonably can to prevent that act on his part. In the first place, the
servant is subject to my control. In the second place, he is occupying my land
and from it he is committing a trespass upon yours; he is using my personal prop-
erty to help along in that trespass, and he is where he is and is able to commit
that trespass because of my act in putting him there and keeping him there." And
in Barrentine v. Henry Wrape Co., 105 Ark. 485, 152 S. W. 158 (1912), the plain-
tiff bases recovery on the neglect of the master in failing to restrain the dangerous
acts. The decision states, "In order to bring the case within the operation of this
rule, it is not always essential that the particular act of negligence should have
been committed by the servant while he is strictly performing the master's service.
...The master owes to his servants, while on his premises to perform service,
and also to strangers who rightfully come upon the premises, the duty of exercising
ordinary care to free the premises from known dangers, all dangers of which the
master is informed." RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1934)
Explanatory Notes § 194C.
7. RESTATEMENT, ToRTs (1934) § 317.
8. 35 Am. JUR., MASTER AND SERVANT § 201.
9. These cases are collected in a series of notes in (1921) 13 A. L. R. 540;
(1922) 20 A. L. R. 882; (1925) 36 A. L. R. 1469; (1926) 43 A. L. R. 492; (1927)
46 A. L. R. 1150.
10. Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act of 1929 § 16378; Kentucky Work-
men's Compensation Act § 4880.
(Vol. 8
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occurrence of dangerous acts of horseplay, injuries caused by such acts are regarded
as arising out of and in the course of the employment."'
The decisions arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, as the one
under discussion here, seem to have followed this same circuitous detour which was
blazed by the common law and the workmen's compensation cases, but they have
failed to make the last bend which returned the others to the main road again,12
and thus an employee injured by a coemployee's horseplay is refused recovery from
the employer because the act was not within thQ actor's scope of employment 13
The case most relied upon as establishing this rule as to the interpretation of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act is that of Davis v. Green,14 in which Mr. Justice
Holmes led the court in refusing recovery to a deceased employee's widow because
the act causing the death was not in furtherance of the employer's business. There
would seem to be, however, a clear distinction between that case and the horseplay
cases in that the injury there was due to a wanton and wilful act on the part
of the coemployee.' 5 The paragraph quoted in the principal case from Jamison v.
Encarnacion8 indicates the discrepancy in such reasoning. It states that if the
employer is liable when mere inadvertence causes the plaintiff's injuries, then it is
unreasonable to hold that an assault, which is a much graver breach of duty, will
not also be called negligence within the federal act. Surely, then, it is not logical
to reverse the statement and say that because the graver offense will not make
the employer liable, the lesser offense will likewise give no recovery. There is a
sufficient difference between holding a master liable for the habitual acts of horse-
play of a servant, and holding him liable for a wanton and wilful killing by a ser-
vant to allow a different decision in the present case. Query, then: is the court
in the principal case justified in resting its decision on the ground that the question
11. Stuart v. Kansas City, 102 Kan. 307, 171 Pac. 913 (1918); Glenn v.
Reynolds Spring Co., 225 Mich. 693, 196 N. W. 617 (1924), 36 A. L. R. 1469(1925); State ex rel. H. S. Johnson Sash & Door Co. v. District Court, Henne-
pin County, 140 Minn. 75, 167 N. W. 283, L. R. A. 1918E 504 (1918); Socha
v. Cudahy Packing Co., 105 Neb. 691, 181 N. W. 706 (1921); Leonbruno v.
Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. E. 711 (1920); Brown, "Arising Out
of and in the Course of the Employment" in Workmen's Compensation Laws (1933)
8 Wis. L. Rv. 217, 229; Note (1929) 5 Wis. L. REv. 169.
12. This interpretation of the Federal Employers' Liability Act is very clearly
enunciated in the case of Roebuck v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 99 Kan. 544, 162 Pac.
1153, L. R. A. 1917E 741 (1917); 72 L. ed. 157, 164. See Griffin v. Baltimore &
0. R. R., 98 W. Va. 168, 126 S E. 571 (1925), 40 A. L. R. 1333 (1926), in which
the court seems to recognize that the knowledge of the employer of the habitual
acts will make a difference as to the decision under the federal act.
13. Jackson v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry., 178 Fed. 432 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910);
Bocian v. Union Pac. R. R., 137 Neb. 318, 289 N. W. 372 (1939); Popadines v.
ErAL LI tLm-s OF CARRIERS (1918) 936.
Davis, 213 App. Div. 9, 209 N. Y Supp. 689 (1st Dept. 1925); 1 ROBERTS, FED-
14. 260 U. S. 349 (1922).
15. The cases dealing with wanton acts of assault, as distinguished from mere
acts of horseplay, are discussed in an annotation in 72 L. ed. 157.
16. 281 U. S. 635 (1930).
19431 RECENT CASES
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has been passed upon by the federal courts in determining liability under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act?
The second point advanced by the plaintiff will, of course, rest on the decision
on the first point, since, as the court indicates, if the defendant has no duty as
to the injurious act, the mere furnishing of a special policeman to give some measure
of protection to the employees will not place such a duty upon him.
J. CRAIG
TORTS-RIGHT OF PRIVACY-LIMITING DEFENSE OF "PUBLIC INTEREST"
Barber v. Time, Inc.1
The defendant, in its weekly news magazine, published an article with plain-
tiff's picture concerning a physical ailment for which she was being treated in
a hospital. The plaintiff had gone to the hospital complaining of an "insatiable
appetite" which could only be appeased by a generous helping of food "every ten
minutes." The plaintiff had protested against reporters taking her picture while
she lay in bed and, upon publication, brought this action for damages on the theory
that her right of privacy had been violated. The court, in affirming a judgment
for the plaintiff, held that the matter was outside the scope of public interest and'
that there was substantial evidence tending to show a serious, unreasonable, un-
warranted, and offensive interference with the private affairs of another.
The right of privacy, or the right to be let alone, was first recognized in
Missouri in 1911 in the case of Mvnden v. Harrir.2 Invasion of the right has been
held to be actionable, in the absence of statute, in only eleven other states (and
Alaska and the District of Columbia)." Where the right has been recognized,
the courts have been inclined to limit recovery to cases where the plaintiff's per-
sonality had been exploited to the direct advantage of the defendant.' Only in-
frequently has a court granted relief in the absence of the "commercial exploita-
tion" element, 5 as was done in the Barber case. The courts have, however, followed
1. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S. W. (2d) 291 (1942).
2. 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911).
3. California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, New
Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina. Two states have
adopted the right by statute: New York Civil Rights Law (McKinney, 1916)§§ 50, 51; UTAH REv. STAT. (1933) §§ 103-4-7 to 103-4-9. Six states have refused
to accept the doctrine: Massachusetts, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island, Washington,
and Wisconsin. The remaining states are still non-committal.
4. The plaintiff has been granted recovery where his picture or name has
been used for advertising or commercial purposes in the following cases: Flake v.
Greensboro News Co., 212 N. Car. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938); Kunz v. Allen, 102
Kans. 883, 172 Pac. 532, L. R. A. 1918D, 1152 (1918); Munden v. Harris, 153
Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky.
424, 120 S. W. 364, 135 Am. St. Rep. 417 (1909); Edison v. Edison Polyform &
Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (1907); Pavesich v. New England Life
Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104 (1905).
5. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S W. (2d) 46 (1931); Melvin v.
Reid, 112 CaL App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Brex v. Smith, 104 N. J. Eq. 386,
[Vol. 8
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a well-recognized exception to the doctrine of protection of the right of privacy
where the matter published is of public interest as "news." 8
The court in the Barber case found that the matter involved was outside the
scope of public interest. In so holding, the court used the analogy-of the physician-
patient privilege in evidence.7 The court said that if there is any right of privacy
at all, it included the right to obtain medical treatment without personal pub-
licity. By using the phrase "personal publicity," the court indicated that if
the ailment was of some medical or public interest, it could be successfully
publicized provided the name and picture of the plaintiff were omitted. This
view appears to have a certain sense of conservative soundness about it, par-
ticularly if the identity or picture of the patient conveyed no additional informa-
tion to the public.8 And yet, where the matter is of public concern, how heavily
should this consideration weigh? Where the article is intended to be read and
understood by lay readers, would not the identity of the person be somewhat neces-
sary to add realism. If so, would not the fact that the article possesses a genuine
amount of public appeal outweigh any such impropriety upon the part of the
publisher?
Whether or not the right to seclude one's self from the public gaze tends to
encroach and abridge the right of free speech and free press appears to be a false
issue.9 The cases, for the most part, are well agreed that only where the latter
rights are so abused as to make the result inharmonious with community and
social interests shall the former predominate 10 Abuse here is synonymous with so-
146 At. 34 (1929); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927); Candler
v. Byfield, 160 Ga. 732, 125 S. E. 905 (1924); Pritchett v. Board of Commissioners
of Knox County, 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N. E. 32 (1908).
6. Where the matter is newsworthy, the right of privacy does not exist.
Themo v. New England News Publishing Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N. E. (2d) 753
(1940); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 304, 95 P. (2d) 491(1939); Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 187 N. E. 292 (1933); Jones
v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972 (1929). See Ex parte Sturm,
152 Md. 114, 136 At. 312, 51 A. L. R. 364 (1927).
7. 21 R. C. L. 377, § 24. See Simonsen v. Swenson, 104 Neb. 224, 177 N. W.
831, 9 A. L. R. 1254 (1920). The patient is given further protection by statute
in Missouri (Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 1895), which even prevents disclosure of
such matters in court
8. "Names and pictures are legitimately used in connection with items of
news, with matters of public men and events, and with matters which are submitted
to the public in a way which invites public comment ... and where the apparent
use is to convey information of interest and not mere advertising." Martin v.
New Metropolitan Fiction, Inc., 139 Misc. 290, 248 N. Y. Supp. 359 (1931). See
Griffin v. Medical Society, 11 N. Y. S. (2d) 109 (1939).
9. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936).
10. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F. (2d) 806 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940),
138 A. L. R. 22 (1940); Themo v. New England News Publishing Co., 306 Mass.
54, 27 N. E. (2d) 753 (1940); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App.
(2d) 304, 95 P. (2d) 491 (1939); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac.
91 (1931); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972 (1929);
Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927); Pavesich v. New England
Life Ins. Co., 12 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104 (1905).
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called unwarranted and undesirable publicity, and where the question of abuse
arises, the courts are oftentimes put to delicately balancing the interests of the
individual against the broader interests of society." The wisdom and integrity
of the judiciary is the only guide-not rules of law.1 2
What is meant by unwarranted and undesirable publicity? The Restatement
of Torts' 3 has said that publicity is unwarranted only when it would be offensive
to persons of ordinary sensibilities-where the intrusion goes beyond the bounds
of decency. Courts have said that publicity is unwarranted and undesirable when
it disturbs another's feelings and causes him mental suffering,' 4 which appears
to be a more subjective view. Indeed the phrase is difficult of accurate and at
the same time concise definition. The most common example has been the pub-
lication of another's name or picture for selfish purposes or for purposes of trade.15
The courts have broadened the scope of the term by holding as unwarranted the
advertising of a debt to coerce payment,' 6 the tapping of the plaintiff's telephone
wires,17 and the public investigation of bank accounts. 18
When the interest of the public to receive "news" enters in, the right of
privacy acquires a new aspect. Frequently the public does have an interest in
an individual which overcomes his right to be let alone. The public must be
informed of matters relating to its education and to its protection19 Thus the
right of privacy does not prohibit the publication of any matter which is of
general or public concern. 20 But where the question has arisen as to the nature
of "public interest," the courts have used a vague approach. This approach has
consisted of defining newsworthy matter as being "that indefinable quality of
interest which attracts attention," 21 but~not to be confused with mere curiousity.
How frequently would not a delicate appreciation of intangible psychological
factors be necessary in determining the question? Probably in the majority of
cases, and certainly in the Barber case.
Since the recent recognition of the existence of the right of privacy, the courts
have used a number of tests in determining whether the right had been invaded.
11. Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 746, (D. C. N. Y. 1936).
12. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68, 106
Am. St. Rep. 104 (1905). •
13. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (Proposed Final Draft No. 9, 1939) § 33.
14. Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424, 120 S. W. 364 (1909); Rober-
son v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902) (dissenting
opinion); Atkinson v. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N. W. 285 (1899) (stated
but not followed); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E.
68, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104 (1905); Henry v. Cherry, 30 R. 1. 13, 73 At. 97, 136
Am. St. Rep. 928 (1909) (stated but not followed).
15. See Note 4 supra.
16. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927).
17. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S. W. (2d) 46 (1931).
18. Brex v. Smith, 104 N. J. Eq. 386, 146 Atl. 34 (1929).
19. Note (1941) 39 Micr. L. REv. 526, at 528; Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc.,
16 F. Supp. 746 (D. C. N. Y. 1936).
20. Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy (1890) 4 HARv. L. REV. 193.
21. Associated Press -%. International News Service, 245 Fed. 244 (1917);
Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. (2d) 304, 95 P. (2d) 491 (1939).
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The early "property right" test 22 was used interchangeably with the "breach of
contract, confidence, and trust" tests. 2  The scope of the right was extended
through the "public figure" test 24 which lessened the chance for recovery on the
theory that a public figure held himself out to the public in such a way as to limit
his right of seclusion. Of recent origin is the "mores" test 25 which is but a variation
of the "public interest" test. This latter-named test has been recently adopted by
a number of courts, though suggested as early as 1893 by Warrn and Brandeis
in conjunction with the "public figure" test.26 Its recent adoption has introduced
a maze of factors for the courts to weigh and consider. Social benefit derived from
the publication, individual sensitivity, public scorn, and other factors involving
individual happiness are but a few. 27 Decision of the case here, as in the better
charted field of defamation, is largely a matter of balancing these interests.28
In the instant case the plaintiff objected strenuously to her licture being
taken as she lay in bed. Although, in the absence of a theory of consent, her
protests are not material to a basic determination of whether or not her interest
was of such a nature that the law should recognize and protect, they do enhance
the extent of the violation, once the court finds the interest an object of protection.
22. Early English courts found that a "property interest" had been invaded
by the appropriation of a personality and gave relief. Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swan.
402, 36 Eng. Rep. 670 (1818); Albert -. Strange, 1 M4c. & G. 25, 41 Eng. Rep.
1171 (1849). American courts have also used this test. Munden v. Harris, 153
Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911); Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co.,
73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Ad. 392 (1907); (1940) 40 COL. L. REv. 1283.
23. Pollard v. Photographic Co., 40 Ch. D. 345 (1888). A federal court in
a recent case referred to these and the "property right" approach as fictions. See
Mau v. Rio Grande Oil, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845, 846 (1939).
24. The term "public figure" was limited to those persons who were public
officers or candidates for office by Warren & Brandeis, loc. cit., note 20. Courts
have expanded the term to those who ask for and desire public recognition and
have thus surrendered this right to the public. Sweenek v. Pathe News, Inc., 16
F. Supp. 746 (D. C. N. Y. 1936); Bartletta v. McFeeley, 107 N. J. Eq. 141, 152
Ad. 17 (1930); Jeffries v. N. Y. Evening Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. 570, 124
N. Y. Supp. 780 (1910); Corliss v. Walker Co., 57 Fed. 434 (1893).
25. Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, Inc., 139 Misc. 290, 248 N. Y. Supp.
359 (1931). Under German law, it was unlawful to injure another contra bonos
mores, which is defined as an act repugnant to the general conscience. For a dis-
cussion of the problem of "privacy" under the Civil Law, see Gutteridge and
Walton, The Comparative Law of the Right of Privacy (1931) 47 L. Q. REv. 203.
26. Warren and Brandeis, cited supra note 20, at 214. See also Ragland, The
Right of Privacy (1929) 17 Ky. L. J. 85.
27. It is generally explained that the law does not discriminate between those
who are sensitive and those who are not. Yet, this rule is not always followed.
Stem v. Robert R. McBride & Co., 159 Misc. 5, 288 N. Y. S. 501 (1936); Melvin
v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230
Ky. 227, 18 S. W. (2d) 972 (1929).
28. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F. (2d) 806, (C. C. A. 2d, 1940),
138 A. L. R. 22; Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27
N. E. (2d) 753 (1940); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927);
Corelli v. Wall, 22 T. L. R. 532 (1906).
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The decision places the court among the forward looking courts in recognizing
and protecting the interest in privacy. What is perhaps of greater significance is
the articulate fashion in which the court sets forth the individual and social
interests involved and then weighs and balances these considerations. If all im-
portant doctrines could be reexamined constantly by this process, law would be
kept more closely abreast changing social values.
LEON E. BLOCH, JR.
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